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There is a Native-American proverb that observes “[w]e do not 
inherit the earth from our ancestors, we borrow it from our children.”
1
  
This centuries old axiom has yet to find its way into American politics.  
The future of human civilization is uncertain. Our planet, undeniably, is 
in peril. Humankind’s greatest challenge will be to manage our 
existence and defend the rarity of complex life from self-destruction.  It 
is now evident that the challenge is made more arduous not solely 
because of apathy or complacency but because of shortsightedness.  The 
power of human intellect, and its potential to eradicate our common 
threats, will be measured by whether it can be coupled with lofty 
ambition.  Duties are needed that forecast a sense of urgency, a call for 
immediate collective action that produces meaningful responses, and 
legislation that protects the planet that we borrow from future 
generations. 
The question of whether human life, its evolution, and the 
development of modern civilization have had a substantial impact on 
 
* Juris Doctor, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark, 2011; Bachelor of Arts, Brown 
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1 Sustainability Quotes, DRURY UNIVERSITY, http://www.drury.edu/ 
multinl/story.cfm?ID=11595&NLID=259 (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
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the planet that hosts it has been answered.  Of the diverse forms of life 
on Earth, only humans have manipulated their ability to alter expansive 
areas.
2
  Half the planet’s surface has been transformed by “human 
activity.”
3
  It is a revolution marked by the “physical impact [humans 
have made on the] land [evidenced by] the lights that brighten our cities, 
the human presence is plainly visible from space.”
4
  Human activity, 
rivaled by no other species, is changing the planet’s atmospheric 
composition.  This activity has generated increased levels of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs), such as carbon dioxide (CO2).
5
  Some of these GHGs 
remain in the planet’s atmosphere for decades and some even centuries. 
Scientists have determined with virtual certainty that atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs will continue to rise over the next few 
decades.
6
  These emissions have led to an “unequivocal warming trend” 
of 1.0 to 1.7 degrees Fahrenheit in the last century alone.
7
  Its 
persistence will only further warm the planet causing radical climatic 
changes. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
observed that the increase in global average temperatures is likely due 
to an “‘increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.’”
8
  
Scientists have declared that unless human activity on the planet is 
dynamically altered, the “atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 
gases [will] continue to . . . [increase and] average global temperatures 
and sea levels will continue to rise as a result and precipitation patterns 
will [irrevocably] change.”
9
  Scientists have determined with remarkable 
certainty that humankind is responsible for the greatest levels of GHG 
concentrations in our atmosphere, and that increased concentration 
 
2 Earth from Space Online Exhibition, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTE, http:// 
www.earthfromspace.si.edu/ online_exhibition_human_presence.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 
2009). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Climate Change: State of Knowledge, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/stateofknowledge.html (last updated Nov. 29, 
2011). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. (quoting Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. 
Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/contents.html) (last visited March 18, 
2012)).  
9 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 5. 
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perpetuates the planet’s warming that threatens life.
10
  Despite this, 
political will to address the impending cataclysm remains idle. 
Methods for intervention remain a subject of debate. Logistics 
have gotten in the way of progress.  The human impulse to survive has 
been quieted by a lack of ingenuity, a desire to pacify the situation 
rather than to remedy it.  The lauded approach in the United States 
centers on GHG-emissions-reduction programs, particularly cap and 
trade programs such as the one that the House of Representatives (the 
House) passed on June 26, 2009, under legislation titled the American 
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES).
11
  ACES marked the 
first time that the House approved a piece of legislation aimed at 
reducing GHG emissions in order to curtail the worsening effects of 
climate change.
12
  The approved House bill’s, however, suffers from a 
fundamental flaw — its inability to establish a domestic response to a 
global crisis.  Cap and trade, as currently designed in the House bill, is 
ill-suited to implement a breakaway from the harmful activities that 
have produced the catastrophic conditions that the world now sits idly 
watching.  The actual harm the program seeks to correct is left 
unaddressed. 
Cap and trade does little, if anything, to eliminate the aggregate 
GHG concentrations in the atmosphere.  Those concentrations are 
principally responsible for global warming.  Cap and trade devises 
schemes that do no more than restrain discharges by nominal 
percentages over decades.  They are impositions that, even at their most 
ambitious levels, accomplish nothing more than a delay of the 
inevitable.  Legislation, such as the ACES bill, takes the greatest 
opportunity ever afforded to human civilization to improve its quality of 
life and reduces it to the greatest deferment of our collective history.  
Cap and trade asserts a moral indifference because it postpones the 
necessary and fails to recognize that, in dealing with climate change, 
difficult decisions must be made. Inevitably, both individuals and 
 
10 Id. 
11 The ACES bill, also known as the Waxman-Markey bill, was narrowly approved by a 
vote of 219 to 212. See American Clean Air and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th 
Cong. (2009), available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2454/action_votes.   
12 ACES marks the first time that the United States Congress has approved a piece of 
legislation aimed at reducing GHG emissions in order to curtail the worsening effects of 
climate change. See John M. Broder, House Passes Bill to Address Threat of Climate 
Change, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/27/ 
us/politics/27climate.html?_r=2&hp. 
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nations will be weary about making concessions that derail their 
economic leverage.  The United States Congress, however, must 
acknowledge these realities and formulate a declarative statement of 
leadership.  Congress has a momentous opportunity to demonstrate that 
it understands the ethical weight of inaction, but, to do so, it must 
observe the failure of implementing a market system that defers 
necessary reductions and does little to promote a new era of innovation. 
Cap and trade has garnered support because of the lack of certainty 
that clouds climate change’s progression.  While scientists have proven 
that an increase in GHG concentration exists and that human activity is 
responsible, they have been unable to answer questions that our culture 
of immediacy expects.
13
  Determinations as to how much warming will 
occur, how fast the warming will happen, and what will be its concrete 
effect on the planet’s climate system remain unanswered.
14
  Without a 
sense of urgency, market-based incentive programs will prevail.  This 
Article demonstrates why plans like the House Waxman-Markey bill
15
 
mislead our nation’s conscience by articulating that something is being 
done, deluding the reality that the something is not enough. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I discusses how market-
based emission reduction programs, particularly the cap and trade 
program in the House ACES bill, are intended to work and why such an 
implementation delegitimizes efforts to combat global climate change. 
This section highlights the inherent practical implementation flaws of 
this approach, particularly, the lack of meaningful changes that ACES 
purports to supply.  Part II considers the emerging field of climate 
change ethics and how a market-based incentive program, like a cap and 
trade system, must engage the ethical considerations that govern 
 
13 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 5. 
14 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) contends that the answers to these 
questions will “require advances in scientific knowledge in a number of areas,” such as 
improved insight on: 
  “[N]atural climatic variations, changes in the sun’s energy, land-use changes, the 
warming or cooling effects of pollutant aerosols, and the impacts of changing humidity and 
cloud cover;” 
  The comparative contribution to climate change of “human activities and natural 
causes;” 
  Projection trends for future greenhouse emissions and “how the climate system will 
respond within a narrow range;” 
  And, the potential for “rapid or abrupt climate change.” 
Id. 
15 See American Clean Air and Security Act of 2009, supra note 11. 
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domestic responses to a global calamity.  This section demonstrates how 
the United Nation’s December 2009 climate change summit in 
Copenhagen reasserted the importance of being able to strike an accord 
that weighs the interests of both the developing and developed worlds.  
Finally, part III recommends that substantial intervention that results in 
a significant revolution in the way human beings relate to their 
environment will require a legally cognizable moral duty from humans 
to the planet that houses them. 
I. WAXMAN-MARKEY’S CAP & TRADE: A FLAWED RESPONSE 
TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
Nearly four months after the House of Representatives passed its 
cap and trade measure, the Pew Research Center for the People and the 
Press’s October 22, 2009 poll revealed that less Americans believed 
solid evidence of climate change existed than they previously thought.
16
 
Nevertheless, the poll does observe that sixty-five percent of people see 
global warming as a “very or somewhat serious problem.”
17
  Of those 
individuals, fifty percent reported being in favor of setting limits on 
carbon emissions, “including making companies pay for emissions, 
even if [it] led to higher energy prices.”
18
  These sentiments have only 
been disavowed by Congressional support of a plan that fails to address 
the imminent seriousness of climate change, a strategy that most 
Americans do not completely understand or are even aware of for that 
matter.
19
  Only twenty-three percent of Americans correctly associated 
cap and trade with energy and the environment.
20
  If cap and trade is a 
 
16 See Modest Support for Cap-and-Trade Policy: Fewer Americans see Solid Evidence 
of Global Warming THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, 
Oct 22, 2009, http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/556.pdf. [hereinafter Pew Research 
Center]. Only 57% of Americans state that they see evidence of climate change.  That 
number is down by 20% since 2006 and 14% since 2008. Of those surveyed only 36% 
reported thinking that global warming was “caused by human activity.”  See Matthew 
McDermott, Just 57% of US Residents See Evidence of Global Warming & 23% Know 
about Cap-and-Trade, TREEHUGGER (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.treehugger.com/ 
files/2009/10/57-percent-us-see-evidence-global-warming.php.  
2009/10/57-percent-us-see-evidence-global-warming.php. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 A Pew Research poll indicates that only twenty-three percent of Americans know to 
what cap and trade refers. 55 percent of those surveyed reported not having heard the term 
before, and 30 percent asserted that they only heard a little about the program. See Pew 
Research Center, supra note 16. 
20 From the sampled polled, 29 percent believed cap and trade was related to health 
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relatively unknown concept to the vast majority of Americans, then why 
has such a plan received so much political support?  The answer lies 
within its market-based approach, a flawed judgment that suggests that 
the market can address all our social ills.  Ironically, notions that the 
market is best equipped to address climate change remain prevalent 
during the greatest economic downturn since the Great Depression.  It is 
a time that reveals that, while the market has the proven potential to 
generate exorbitant amounts of wealth, it can also spiral out of control, 
producing consequences that no group is immune from without a 
vigilant body steering it.  It is in this system that the 111th United States 
Congress has wagered the fate of our planet and our civilization. 
Cap and trade is “politically favorable” because it is seen as 
“[possessing] economic efficiency advantages over a [carbon] tax 
[system].”
21
  Cap and trade systems control the quantity of emissions 
and allow the market to determine the most desirable price.  Proponents 
of this system assert that it “allows science to identify the level of 
emissions reduction necessary to achieve climate stabilization.”
22
  
Ideally, the cap is set at the “scientifically sound level,” which would 
produce the desired emissions reductions.
23
 
Cap and trade basically functions by having the government set a 
limit on the amount of GHGs that are emitted into the atmosphere.
24
  
Emissions that exceed the government limit result in fines.
25
  The 
government then disseminates a predetermined set of allowances to the 
industry.
26
  These allowances can be distributed by being auctioned off, 
given away for free based on “historic levels of pollution,” or some 
combination of the two.
27
  The auction process is more ideal, but the 
polluting industry dislikes it for the obvious reason that the alternative 
free allocation “seemingly reward[s]” them.
28
  This system creates a 
market-based incentive for industry to reduce its GHG emissions.  
 
care, banking reform, and unemployment. Id.  
21 Heather Hosterman & Brian C. Murray, Climate Change, Cap-and-Trade and the 
Outlook for U.S. Policy, 34 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 699, 707 (2009). 
22 Id.  
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 707-708. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See Matthew McDermott, Cap and Trade Explained—The Short Attention Span 
Version, PLANET GREEN, http://video.planetgreen.discovery.com/tech-transport/cap-trade-
explained-short.html (last visited Feb 18, 2012). 
28 Id. 
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Essentially, a company that emits GHGs below the amount of credits it 
has been allotted can “sell those credits to some other company” that 
has not been as successful.
29
  This process proceeds as the cap continues 
to be reduced over time, thus restricting the amount of GHG that 
industry can emit. 
Supporters of cap and trade attest that a well-designed system can 
decrease the costs associated with achieving a given emissions target.
30
  
A well-designed approach grants companies “flexibility” in terms of 
how much GHGs they can emit.
31
  The price of the allowance is adjusted 
through trading until emissions are brought down to the predetermined 
cap.
32
  Ideally, this process establishes a market where allowances reach 
their “highest-valued use, protecting those emissions that are the most 
costly to reduce.”
33
  Supporters, however, recognize that the cost of 
achieving substantial reductions depends on the accessibility and cost of 
low and GHG-free technologies.
34
  These factors can be addressed in 
systems that establish reduction targets well into the future because they 
supply “price signals” which allow companies to invest in the research 
and development of sustainable technologies.
35
 
Waxman-Markey’s cap and trade program, if implemented as 
proposed, is susceptible to causing more irrevocable harm than it will 
mitigate.  The problems associated with the system’s implementation 
are easily detected and for the most part can all be corrected.  Private 
interest lobbying, however, has made it nearly impossible for 
lawmakers to address the proposal’s shortcomings.  What occurs most 
 
29 Id. Under a cap and trade system companies are required to meet the cap and thus are 
left with the option of either purchasing or selling emission allowances “depending on their 
pollution abatement costs and the market priced of the emissions allowance.”  The 
companies that manage to cut their emissions at a lower cost than the allowance’s market 
value will “abate more and purchase fewer (or sell extra) allowances, while [companies] that 
cannot cut their emissions below the allowance’s market value will purchase more 
allowances.”  See Murray, supra note 15, at 708. 
30 See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap and Trade System to Address Climate 
Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 295 (2008), available at 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ 
Stavins_Climate_Change.pdf. 
31 Companies would have to appropriately relinquish “an allowance for each ton of 
emissions.  [Therefore companies] will undertake all emission reductions that are less costly 
than the market price of an allowance.” Id.  
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Stavins, supra note 30, at 298. 
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often is a further disruption of a system already designed to not 
accomplish anything meaningful.  Measures are now designed to solely 
appear as though they are aimed at addressing a critical issue.  In reality, 
legislation is drafted in ways that do more harm than good, which defers 
what must be done now to another generation. 
Climate change is the greatest threat facing human civilization and 
yet the best solution politicians and economists can come up with is a 
system that lends itself to partisanship and special interest.  This is 
certainly the case for the recent incarnations of cap and trade proposals 
in the 111th United States Congress.  The Waxman-Markey cap and 
trade bill, which narrowly passed the House of Representatives in the 
summer of 2009, marked the first time a climate change bill was 
adopted by either chamber of Congress.
36
  While many celebrated this as 
a momentous shift in our politics, close examination raises concern for 
what the bill, if approved by the United States Senate, would actually 
achieve. 
The House bill would place a cap on GHG emissions attributed to 
global warming below 2005 levels.
37
  The emission reduction focuses on 
industries accounting for eighty-five percent of the national economy.
38
  
The program’s emissions cut would start in 2012 and be completely 
phased in by 2016, and it is scheduled to run through 2050.
39
  The 
targets would progressively increase with an initial three percent cut by 
2012, seventeen percent cut by 2020, forty-two percent cut by 2030, and 
over eighty percent cut by 2050.
40
 
While the eighty-three percent cut by 2050 would appear quite 
ambitious, the truth is that it is not a lofty goal at all, not when the bill is 
designed to give eighty-five percent of the systems allowances away for 
free during its first few years.
41
  The Waxman-Markey cap and trade bill 
 
36 John M. Broder, supra note 12. 
37 Kate Sheppard, Everything You Always Wanted to Know about the Waxman-Markey 
Energy/Climate Bill—in Bullet Points, GRIST (June 3, 2009, 6:43 AM), 
http://www.grist.org/article/2009-06-03-waxman-markey-bill-breakdown. 
38 Some of the industries that would be covered under the House bill include electricity 
producers, oil refineries, natural gas suppliers, and energy-intensive businesses focused on 
iron, steel, cement, and even paper. Id.   
39 Id. 
40 See ACELA Summary and Comparison to the ACES Act, Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/acela-summary-aces-act-
comparison-oct2009.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
41 The percentage of free allowances would decrease over time. See Amanda DeBard, 
CBO: House Climate Bill to Raise $973B, THE WASH. TIMES (June 8, 2009),  
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represents what some have called “the final absurd expression of the 
failed pollution paradigm that has defined climate policy for over a 
decade.”
42
  The bill, while claiming to cut nearly seventeen percent of 
emissions by 2020, actually would permit “regulated industries to emit 
as much as a third more carbon in 2012 than they did in 2005 and close 
to ten percent more in 2020.”
43
 
The bill from the outset is also subject to the failing concession of 
early over-allocation. Aside from over-allocation, the bill also provides 
firms with the opportunity to bank as many of these allowances as it 
wishes.
44
  While supporters of the bill would highlight that there is a 
strict penalty for exceeding emissions beyond its allowances, the fact is 
that the penalty is unlikely to occur since more allowances are 
distributed than are needed to meet the emission’s target.
45
 
The bill fails to establish any sort of stringency aimed at promoting 
innovation that will cut GHG emissions dramatically.  The bill is set up 
to issue out eighty-five percent of allowances for free and only fifteen 
percent of the permits would be auctioned off at the start of trading 
program.
46
 According to the EPA, the value of a permit to emit at least 
one ton of GHG would be worth around $11 to $15 per ton in 2012 and 
it would increase to about $22 to $28 per ton in 2025.
47
 With over eighty 
percent of the allowances being given out for free, the House bill is 
forfeiting an exorbitant amount of revenue that can be used for research 
and development. 
The use of cap and trade to incentivize innovation is the principal 
area where cap and trade is flawed.  Most proposals that claim that 
emissions trading engenders innovation fail to properly define 
innovation.
48
  Some scholars find it helpful to define innovation as 
 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/08/cbo-house-climate-bill-raise-973b/. 
42 Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, The Flawed Logic of the Cap and Trade 
Debate, YALE ENVIRONMENT 360 (May 19, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/content/print.msp? 
id=2153. 
43 Id. 
44 See Sheppard, supra note 37. 
45 The penalty is set to be a fine two times the fair market value of the permits the firm 
should have acquired. Id.  
46 The percentage of permits auctioned off would increase overtime. See id. 
47 By 2012, the value of all permits would be $60 billion and $113 billion in 2025. See 
id. 
48 Economists characterize innovation as “the commercialization of an invention,” as 
distinguished from “diffusion” which is the “adoption of a successful innovation by firms 
and individuals.”  See David M. Driesen, Design, Trading, and Innovation, MOVING TO 
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involving “both the invention and [the] use of something new.”
49
  
Innovation, therefore, requires technological developments to be 
coupled with a shift in the practices of human behavior.
50
  For this 
definition to hold true, cap and trade programs would have to strictly 
promote innovation whenever a GHG emitter or a firm develops a new 
technique in response to that program and then the emitter uses the 
technique to reduce pollution.
51
  The view is that cap and trade makes 
the notion of environmental innovation appealing to all the parties 
involved in the system because it can “either offer qualitatively better 
environmental results or reduce the cost of [meeting] a particular 
[emissions reduction target].”
52
 
Revenue from the fifteen percent of emissions allowances that 
would be auctioned off by the federal government in the in first few 
years of the Waxman-Markey program would be invested in particular 
ways.  Roughly fifteen percent would be used to offset greater energy 
costs for lower income families.
53
  Only 1.5 percent would actually be 
used to foster research and development for GHG free and energy 
efficient technology.
54
  The bill does not make innovation, which could 
reverse the trends of climate change, a priority. 
The bill also appears to focus more on adaptation rather than on 
mitigation.  For instance, two percent of the total revenue from each 
year’s auction, compared to the 1.5 percent for research and 
development, would be used to help the United States brace itself for 
the negative effects of climate change from 2012 through 2021.
55
  After 
that period the total percentage would increase to four percent from 
2022 through 2026, and eight percent after that.
56
  Aside from only 
 
MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LESSONS AFTER 20 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE, 3 
(Jody Freeman and Charles Kolstad eds., Oxford University Press 2005), available at 
http://www.law.syr.edu/Pdfs/0oxford.pdf.  
49 Id.  
50 Innovation is best defined by “borrow[ing] a concept found in patent law,” that of 
implying a “non-obvious departure from prior practice.” Id.  
51 However, this definition also implies that the emitter would “not generally accept 
diffusion of techniques invented before the program’s onset as innovations.” Id.  The 
rationale is, but for a cap and trade’s ability to induce innovation, polluters would not seek 
the development and implement of that innovation. 
52 Id. at 4. 
53 See Sheppard, supra note 37. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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reserving 1.5 percent for innovation the bill only allots, from 2012 to 
2021, 0.5 percent to facilitate the American workforce’s transition away 
from GHG dependent industries.
57
 
Some of the allowances would also be given to corporations not 
regulated under the Waxman-Markey legislation.  These corporations 
would be allowed to sell the allowances and use the revenue for very 
specific purposes.  The bill provides that thirty percent of these 
allowances would be given to local electricity companies, which are 
typically regulated by state governments.
58
  The profit from the sale of 
these allowances would be used to sustain low energy prices for 
consumers.
59
  States would also receive about ten percent of the 
allowance but they would be required to use the proceeds to invest in 
renewable energy and related conservation efforts.
60
  The Waxman-
Markey bill fails to establish a meaningful commitment to climate 
change focused on innovation because it does not provide substantial 
support for development and emissions reduction up front.  For 
example, the first substantial amount of funds dedicated to new energy 
technologies would not come to pass until 2025 when $190 billion 
would be set aside.
61
 
A major flaw of the Waxman-Markey cap and trade system lies 
with its allocation of emission credits/allowances.  Caps that are not 
“adequately stringent” are not likely to be effective even if the caps are 
met.
62
  The over-allocation problem makes cap determinations irrelevant 
because there is a lack of will in the political system to set caps at levels 
that would achieve socially-desirable “environmental goals.”
63
  This 
imperfection is the easiest to correct.  It requires, however, that 
lawmakers be courageous and take on the industries that fund their 
campaigns.  Aside from being the easiest to correct, over-allocation has 
the potential to cause the most harm, so as to make the very 
 
57 The percentage would subsequently increase to one percent from 2022 to 2050.  Id. 
58 Id. 
59 See Sheppard, supra note 37. 
60  Id. 
61 $90 billion would go towards energy-efficient and renewable energy technologies; 
$60 billion would be reserved for carbon-capture and sequestration technology; $20 billion 
for electric and other alternative energy automotive technology; and the final $20 billion 
would go towards basic scientific research and development.  Id. 
62 Lesley K. McAllister, The Over Allocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving 
toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 397(Spring 2009), available at 
http://www.columbiaenvironmentallaw.org/assets/pdfs/34.2/7._McAllister_34.2.pdf. 
63 Id.  
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implementation of cap and trade system an unworthy venture. The 
effects of over-allocation consist of low allowance prices, deference of 
emissions reduction, and the inevitable “buildup of large allowance 
banks.”
64
  One popular approach for correcting the system proneness to 
over-allocation is to set caps at levels that require emissions reductions 
that are as great as those that “would be achieved by maintaining the use 
of technologically and economically feasible emissions control 
technologies.”
65
  However, the basic problem with this proposed 
solution is that it is entirely speculative.  It is difficult to know what 
types of standards the government would set if it ultimately chooses to 
use a cap and trade system over direct regulation.  If the government 
adopts a cap and trade approach to combat climate change, regulators 
would be unable to determine with certainty what technology-based 
standards could accomplish without implementing an emissions 
reduction system first.  Cap and trade, however, would avoid this form 
of direct regulation because it relies exclusively on the market to 
determine the value of allowances.  In essence, this proposed solution 
would depend on comparative information that would remain 
unavailable if the cap and trade strategy is implemented. 
Cap and trade programs, typically, have annual caps determined at 
the outset for the duration of the program.  Hence, the regulated parties 
have the opportunity to know how many allowances they will receive in 
any given year.
66
  It is important to observe that under most existing cap 
and trade programs more allowances are issued than are actually 
necessary.
67
  The United States Acid Rain Program (ARP), the Los 
Angeles Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM), the 
Chicago Emissions Reduction Market System (ERMS), and the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) have all suffered 
from over-allocation of allowances.
68
  This trend of over-allocation 
 
64 Id. 
65 By initially setting stringent caps then overall system caps can be reduced to “levels 
warranted by feasibility.”  Id. at 398. 
66 If the cap and trade program permits “banking,” then firms are able to save unused 
allowances for a later time or to trade them in the future.  Id. 
67 Id. 
68  The ARP, credited for having diminished the level of sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions 
responsible for the acid deposition of the northeastern United States, had initial set of 
allowances allocated by multiplying the emitters’ average fuel consumption during a 
baseline time period with an emission rate of 2.5 lbs of SO2 per million BTU. Many of these 
firms were issued additional allowance for either installing pollution control devices that 
remove pollutants from exhaust streams, voluntarily reducing emissions before the program 
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demonstrates that caps have traditionally failed to be set at levels that 
yield meaningful reductions.  In some of the cap and trade programs 
mentioned above, “absolute over-allocation” resulted in very few, if 
any, emissions reductions that could be attributed to the program.
69
  
However, most programs suffer from over-allocation during the initial 
implementation period.  This is ultimately a consequence of politics, 
which many times works to garner support for the program but 
inevitably concedes the program’s effectiveness. 
Over-allocation circumvents the outcome of any cap and trade 
program by diminishing the value of allowances.  It is basic economics; 
whenever allowances exceed the number needed to meet reduction 
targets their value is reduced.
70
  Low allowance prices make ambitious 
 
was implanted, and for “undertaking efficiency and renewable measures.”  Most 
disappointingly, many of the firms subject to this program were allowed to utilize some of 
the system’s “substitution provisions,” which basically allowed emitters to substitute other 
units for the units detailed in the statute and therefore qualify for allowances that were 
determined by the “historic emissions of those units.” 
  Under RECLAIM, which is the oldest cap and trade program in the United States, 
allowances were also based on the historical annual level of emissions multiplied by a set 
emissions rate.  RECLAIM, however, differed from ARP in that it determined allocations 
based on the highest emissions year over a multi-year period and not on an average.  The 
problem with RECLAIM was that the baseline period it used suffered from an economic 
recession, thus, emitters were not functioning at their highest production levels.  The result 
was that the allowances allotted were greater than in any of the years highlighted in the 
baseline period.  RECLAIM was projected to allocate allowances in surplus of real 
emissions during its initial years of implementation.  However, allowances were issued in 
“excess of emissions for five years.” 
  The ERMS, initiated in 2000 to control volatile organic materials (VOM) in Chicago, 
allocated allowances based on emissions in a three year period.  Each firm’s “emissions 
baseline” was determined by averaging its two greatest levels. The cap for each year was 
then set 12% lower than its emissions baseline.  The result was that every year allowances 
outnumbered emissions. In 2003 and 2004, “emissions were more than 50% below the cap.”  
This program also allowed firms to bank allowances for use in subsequent years.  In 2003, 
firms were able to bank double the number of allowances they used to cover their emissions. 
  The EU ETS, the world’s first cap and trade program focused on reducing emissions 
affecting climate change, has multi-year caps set and it does not have a limit on how many 
allowances a firm can bank.  The cap was defined by the sum number of allowances 
allocated to each European Union state.  Most states allocated allowances for free.  Only 
four states established an auction to disseminate allowances.  From 2005 to 2007, over five 
percent more allowances were issued than were needed to cover emissions.  Id. 
69 Absolute over-allocation occurs when emissions are lower than the cap and are 
expected to be “lower than the cap in the future such that the price of allowances collapses.” 
Id.  
70 The market prices for allowances are significant because they signal the “marginal 
cost of abatement at the quantity of emissions allowed by the cap.” McAllister, supra note 
62, at 398. 
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reduction levels less likely to be met.  This theory has been proven true 
by all of the existing American and European cap and trade programs.  
Observations from current cap and trade programs suggests that 
allowance prices have been low because of an “overly ample supply of 
allowances” and not “unanticipated declines in control costs.”
71
 
As a consequence of over-allocation, cap and trade programs, as a 
whole, have been unsuccessful in encouraging innovation.
72
  The lack of 
innovation under many programs is associated with absolute or early 
over-allocation and a lack of strictness, which is overwhelmingly seen 
to encourage the largest strides for environmentally sound technological 
improvements.
73
  In order for future cap and trade programs to be 
successful and worth the investment, their chief objective must be to 
produce significant environmental benefits, not just political posturing 
that aims to appease concerns over the harmful effects of industry 
practices. In order to achieve this goal, allowances can only be issued 
where they would foster a market price that stimulates consequential 
emissions reductions and technological innovation.
74
 Essentially, the 
caps in these programs have to be significantly strict.  The approach 
should look towards regulating the allowance market tightly by 
recognizing that cap and trade must create incentives for innovation that 
lowers long-term costs.  The solution, potentially, could be found in 
“rewarding any means of reducing emissions” through the use of newly 
developed technologies in the short term.
75
  Furthermore, the regulations 
governing this market should establish a means by which additional 
allowances are only issued when the emitters exceed the minimum 
reduction targets by a specific percentage. 
Avoiding over-allocation is one approach but emission reduction 
targets that fail to demonstrate any measure of ambition and boldness 
will do little to change the business-as-usual attitude of polluters.  Caps 
that seek monumental reduction percentages in the immediate term 
 
71 Id. 
72 Margaret R. Taylor et al., Regulation as the Mother of Innovation: the Case of SO2 
Control, 27 LAW  & POL’Y  349–50 (2005).   
73 Id. at 350-51. 
74 See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 115 (2005).  
75 Robert Stavins, Cap-and-Trade Versus the Alternatives for U.S. Climate Policy, 
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Oct. 5, 2009), 
http://belfercenter.ksg.havard.edu/analysis/stavins/?p=355. 
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rather than build up to them can force innovation to flourish as well as 
correct social behaviors concerning the environment by setting strict 
and completely feasible standards.
76
  Legislation needs to stop being 
framed under the guise of low expectations; issues as perilous as climate 
change require audacity and recognition that sacrifice is necessary.
77
  A 
program is not sufficiently rigid if its caps do not reflect the most 
advantageous level of emissions reduction.
78
 This is the level at which 
the marginal advantage of an extra unit of emission reduction equals the 
trivial cost incurred by society for making that additional unit.
79
  This 
standard for setting caps, while ideal, has proven impracticable due to 
the difficulty of computing social costs.
80
  Cap and trade, and the market 
forces that guide it, are unlikely to put a value on the “priceless.” 
Apart from issuing free allowances, the House bill would allow 
emitters to purchase carbon offsets in order to meet a percentage of their 
emissions target.
81
  Essentially, offsets would be used to fund third party 
clean-energy projects.
82
  However, an offset in and of itself will never be 
 
76 Some scholars suggest that these standards can be modeled after those appearing in 
the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. Some of these standards include the “lowest 
achievable emission rate,” the “best available control technology,” the “best available 
demonstrated control technology,” and the “best available technology.” McAlister, supra 
note 62, at 427. 
77 There are federal statutes which require regulators to “base pollution standards on 
what is technologically and economically achievable,” rather than to set standards on what 
needs to be achieved.  See Jason Scott Johnson, Tradable Pollution Permits and the 
Regulatory Game, THIRTY YEARS OF MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLLUTION: A RETROSPECTIVE, at 353 (Oxford University Press 2006). 
78 Environmental Protection Agency, TOOLS OF THE TRADE: A GUIDE TO DESIGNING AND 
OPERATING A CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM FOR POLLUTION CONTROL, EPA430-B-03-002, at 
A1-A2 (June 2003).  
79 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 41-44 (1960). 
80 See generally David M. Driesen, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
21 (2003).  In order to satisfy caps set at this level polluters would have to decrease 
emissions to “[t]he point at which the marginal cost of removing a ton of pollution equals 
the social benefit from having that ton removed.”  The costs attributed to emissions would 
reflect the overall “social and economic value of pollution reduction, creating efficiency in 
achieving social welfare.”  Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the 
Utility Sector’s Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide Under the 
Clean Air Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 378 (2001). 
81 Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Newest Hybrid: Notes Toward Standardized 
Certification of Carbon Offsets, 34 N.C.J. INT’L & COM. REQ. 851, 861 (2009). 
82 Offsets are seen as an innovation of compliance markets. Firms, outside of 
purchasing allowances from other covered parties can now also meet their emission cut 
target by paying “another entity to cover its emissions when that entity otherwise would not 
be required to do so.”  Id. 
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able to succeed in mitigating climate change.
83
  Still, Waxman-Markey 
would allow offsets to account for up to two billion tons of each year’s 
total emission cuts.
84
  The offset buy-in signals the lawmakers’ failure to 
realize that the purpose of a cap and trade system is to cut emissions, 
not just offset them.  While the Waxman-Markey bill is unlikely to ever 
make it to President Obama’s desk anytime soon, there is still a 
possibility that some version of it reconciled with some version of the 
Senate Boxer-Kerry bill formally known as the Clean Energy Jobs and 
American Power Act
85
 will be passed, and therefore close attention must 
be paid to the offset provisions. 
Many projections have been made regarding the potential that the 
United States will adopt some form of a cap and trade system in the 
near future.  More importantly is the fact that if such a system is 
adopted, a carbon offset market is “projected to grow exponentially 
because regulated entities will likely be allowed to meet a significant 
portion of their targeted reductions through offsets.”
86
  In dealing with 
the Waxman-Markey and Boxer-Kerry’s inclusion of an offset option it 
must be addressed that while at least ten carbon offset programs exist, 
each with their own certification standards, to date there is no single 
“standardized certification program for carbon offsets” and thus there is 
a great potential for “fraud in the market.”
87
 
In a report released in September of 2008, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) warned of the lack of federal oversight in 
the carbon offset market.
88
  Without some degree of vigilance in 
monitoring offsets certification, any domestic cap and trade program, 
especially the Waxman-Markey, will lend itself to racketeering.  This is 
precisely why the bill had to name the Environmental Protection 
 
83 Id. 
84 The two billion tons worth of offsets may account for up to 15 percent of emission 
cuts in 2012 and 33 percent by 2050. See Sheppard, supra note 27. 
85 See Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009), 
available at  http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-s1733/text 
86 See Savasta-Kennedy, supra note 81, at 864. 
87 Id. at 855-56. 
88 The GAO report stated that “[t]he proliferation of standards has caused confusion in 
the market, and the existence of multiple quality assurance mechanisms with different 
requirements raises questions about the quality of offsets available on the voluntary market, 
according to many stakeholders.”  See id. (citing U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, 
Report to Cong. Requesters, Carbon Offsets, The U.S. Market is Growing, but Quality 
Assurance Poses Challenges for Market Participants, GAO-08-1048, 56-57, app. VII 
(2008)).  
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Agency (EPA) as the main “adjudicator of what qualifies as a good 
offset and whether it is being used.”
89
  However, the bill’s Senate 
counterpart, Boxer-Kerry, offers much less precision in its instruction as 
to what qualifies as an offset.
90
 
The bill’s offset provision hinders its mission of establishing 
American leadership in the climate change debate.  Currently, high 
GHG emitting nations have either not made strong enough 
commitments or have just not committed to any reduction at all.  India, 
like most developing countries, has refused to pledge a reduction of 
their emissions until developed nations have not only demonstrated a 
promise but have made “actual emissions cuts.”
91
  In turn, the developed 
nations, particularly the United States, have recognized that leadership 
is necessary and that a strong commitment on their part must come first. 
Nevertheless, the United States and other industrial powers want 
some guarantee that their cuts will not be futile if China and India 
continue with their trend of ever-rising emissions.
92
 The Waxman-
Markey bill was to address these concerns by marking U.S. leadership, 
which was expected to facilitate commitments from developing nations.  
The bill, however, seemingly ignored the effects of offering an 
“estimated $13 billion a year,” growing to over $80 billion annually in 
2050, to allow GHG emitters to purchase international offset credits 
from the developing world.
93
  Economists have suggested that these 
offset purchases would prompt “poor countries not to accept caps.”
94
  
The bill’s offset provision rewards a developing nation’s unwillingness 
to cooperate with emissions reductions all while nurturing the potential 
for an international racketeering scheme. 
The 219 to 212 close vote count is the one positive thing to take 
away from the bill’s passage.
95
  While partisanship and private interest 
 
89 Russ Choma, Climate Bill Breakdown, GRIST (Oct. 8, 2009, 5:48 AM), 
http://grist.org/politics/2009-10-07-climate-bill-breakdown/. 
90 Id. 
91 William Antholis, India and Climate Change, WALL ST. J. (July 20, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124787011359360457.html. 
92 Id. 
93 Steven Stoft and Dana Kirshner, A Carbon Protect Racket, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR (July 27, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/ Commentary/Opinion/2009/0727/ 
p09s01-coop.html. 
94 Purchasing foreign offset credits only compensates international emitters for emitting 
“less than they would have emitted,” while applying a cap would cut back on what “they 
would have emitted.” Id. 
95 See American Clean Air and Security Act of 2009, supra note 11. 
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lobbying does deserve most of the credit, vigilance and a healthy dose 
of skepticism did play its role.  A Democrat from Ohio, Congressman 
Dennis Kucinich, explained that he did not vote in favor of the 
Democratic plan because the bill was a “fragile compromise, which 
leads some to claim that we cannot do better.”
96
  Passage of the bill, 
beyond not producing a quality intervention, creates the illusion that the 
problem of climate change is being addressed.
97
  The legislation asserts 
meaningless emission cuts because it does not require reductions below 
current levels until 2030.
98
  The bill does nothing more than “kick the 
can down the road, by requiring the bulk of emissions to be carried out 
in the long term” and requiring minimal and insignificant cuts in the 
short term.
99
  Kucinich, and the conscience of the program, were 
silenced.  The eight amendments that the Congressman sponsored were 
not allowed to be heard by the entire House of Representatives.
100
 
For all it is touted to achieve, the House bill fails to consider the 
program’s costs.  It is money that could be better spent on ingenuity and 
innovation that will change the human behavior that caused the harm to 
begin with.  If leadership on global climate change is what the 
Waxman-Markey bill endeavored to signal, then the people of the world 
should be concerned that their leaders will follow suit.  The proposed 
cap and trade bill is the wrong approach.  The responsibility of sincerely 
addressing climate change, which then-candidate Obama spoke about, 
will continue to remain unappreciated if lackluster measures continue to 
gain traction at the highest levels of our government.
101
  True reforms 
 
96 THE CLEVELAND LEADER, Dennis Kucinich Lays Out Why He Voted Against Clean 
Energy Act (June 27, 2009), http://www.clevelandleader.com/node/10478. 
97 Democratic Congressman Dennis Kucinich observed that passage of the bill “only 
create[d] the illusion of addressing the problem.” Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. (“We are not only failing to take the action when it is needed to address rapid 
global warming, but we are assuming the long term targets will remain intact.”). 
100 Three of the amendments sought to minimize the “damage that [would] be done by 
offsets,” three others would have required “all federal energy to eventually come from 
renewable resources” in order to spearhead the transition to a “green economy,” one 
amendment would have moved the year by which GHG cuts were “required from 2030 to 
2025” in order to avoid the inefficient use of allowances, and finally the last amendment 
would have disqualified “trash incineration” as a means of renewable energy because, as 
Rep. Kucinich observes, it is a source of “environmental injustice in the country” since its 
harmful health effects are generated in facilities “disproportionately sited in” low income 
communities.  Interestingly enough, incinerators generally emit more CO2 “per unit of 
electricity produced than coal-fired power plants.”  Id. 
101 John M. Broder, Obama Affirms Climate Change Goals, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 
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and steadfast commitments can demonstrate that the “global political 
system is not unlike the global climate system, changes here make 
changes there.”
102
 
The House’s cap and trade system is deemed an attractive option 
because it appears to be less “punitive” than a direct carbon tax and 
“more responsive” to market conditions.
103
  However, as the European 
Union’s experience with its trading system can show, the flexibility to 
respond to market conditions allows for a decrease in carbon value.  The 
diminishing value of carbon causes the market pressure to reduce 
emission to waiver.
104
  One potential solution to this problem is to avoid 
establishing cap levels for the full duration of the program.  Although 
setting caps in advance has earned a lot of support because it allows 
firms to have a “predictable environment for making compliance 
decisions, this approach has some drawbacks.”
105
  Setting future caps at 
the outset of the program makes such caps impassive to unexpected 
environmental developments, economic circumstances, and 
technological development. 
The cap and trade system that made its way through the House and 
began to be formulated in the Senate in early 2010 fashioned an 
imperfect solution to calamitous threat.  These shortcomings, however, 
are not immune from cap and trade’s more popular alternatives.  The 
carbon tax, with all its limitations however, can provide better results, 
all while avoiding the flaws plaguing cap and trade’s implementation.  
A tax-based climate change control program can “provide stronger and 
more stable incentives than [Congress’] cap-and-trade approach to get 
business and households to transition to low-carbon technologies and 
fuels.”
106
  A carbon tax also addresses cap and trade’s inability to 
 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/us/politics/19climate.html 
102 The Wages of Waxman-Markey, THE ECONOMIST (July 6, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/07/the_wages_of_waxmanmar
key (suggesting that while the Waxman-Markey bill “won’t save the world alone” it can 
“change the political dynamics” affecting climate change policy). 
103 Stop the Vote! Can a Cap-and-Trade System Really Work to Reduce Emission in the 
U.S., ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS NETWORK (Dec. 6, 2007, 9:04 AM), 
http://www.enn.com/pollution/article/26684/print. 
104 It becomes “cheaper to purchase credits instead of reducing [GHG emissions].”  Id.  
105 See Stavins, supra note 30, at 299, 307 (arguing that weighing equally the integrity 
of long term emission reduction targets and the programs flexibility “is an important issue 
for the success [of any cap and trade program]”). 
106  Robert J. Shapiro and Elaine C. Kamarck, A Carbon Tax Would Be Sunnier, 
POLITCO (Dec. 9, 2009), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30348.html. 
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account for the volatility of carbon prices.  Conversely, a carbon tax sets 
a definitive price so that companies can “figure how much they might 
earn by developing climate-friendly fuels and technologies” and both 
they and consumers at large “can calculate how much [can] be saved by 
adopting them.”
107
 
Some scholars also suggest that the carbon tax is a more stable 
alternative over cap and trade when considered in the context of the 
world’s current “financial market problem[s].”
108
  The House program 
would essentially “create $1 trillion in new financial instruments—the 
emission permits for almost every form of energy—that would 
immediately be transformed into securities and derivatives and then 
traded on Wall Street.”
109
  A carbon tax avoids this scenario because 
there are no permits to trade, and thus it evades the fiasco of “increasing 
incidents of manipulation and insider trading” that has plagued the 
European Trading Scheme.
110
  This alternative approach, of course, will 
not be invulnerable to special interest lobbying.  However, because a 
carbon tax is “easier to understand . . . special-interest horse trading, 
and other attempts to wrangle exemptions will be much more obvious,” 
and as a result adoption this measure will be much more transparent.
111
 
Finally, both the House and Senate’s cap and trade programs are 
weak proposals because they do not adhere to the “economic-induced 
innovation hypothesis.”
112
  If the theory holds true, then tough ambitious 
regulation, regardless if it comes in the form of a market-based 
instrument, needs to raise the cost of “routine compliance” in order to 
facilitate innovation aimed at avoiding the high costs of adherence.
113
  A 
trading scheme that does not implement such a strategy will never 
encourage immeasurably needed innovation.  Even innovation that 
would assure “long-term efficiency and enormous environmental 
improvement” would be unlikely produced.
114
 
 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Shapiro & Kamarck, supra note 86. 
112 Induced innovation hypothesis is an economic theory that suggests that high costs 
will tend to encourage innovation. See Driesen, supra note 34, at 6. 
113 Id. 
114 Empirical data observes that trading is unlikely to facilitate even significantly 
inexpensive developments. Under most cap and trade programs only innovation that costs 
less than the “marginal cost of additional reductions at facilities with relatively low control 
costs can find a market.”  Id. at 28.  
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II. AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONDING TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
In practice, both the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer cap and 
trade systems would fail to assert an ethical obligation between people, 
government, and their planet.  These systems are plagued with flaws 
that make them susceptible to status quo thinking and ethical 
indifference.  Any proposal to combat the harms of climate change must 
be framed around the moral implications that arise from inaction or 
ineffectiveness. 
Any mitigating measure must be in sync with the emerging climate 
justice movement. Climate justice’s purpose is to deal with the concerns 
that arise from “the intersection of climate change with race, poverty, 
and preexisting environmental risks.”
115
  The American response to 
climate change and its inevitable effects has not taken seriously the 
potentially devastating impacts that it and inadequate policies aimed at 
addressing it will have on poor and of-color communities.  
Unfortunately, despite the hopes of some, the recent discourse on 
climate change in the United States has not seriously pondered the 
plight of those most overlooked.
116
 
There are views, however, which suggest that a cap and trade 
program can be salvaged, but only if it takes a hard-line stance in favor 
of environmental justice by incorporating a domestic clean development 
mechanism (CDM).  CDMs are capable of producing extraordinary 
benefits. It would allow for “poor and of-color communities” to have a 
voice in the cap and trade market that would “otherwise exclude 
them”.
117
  These communities would be able to establish offsetting 
projects that would be consistent with new policy and improve the 
conditions of their communities simultaneously.  This measure would 
ultimately allow the United States to take responsibility for its 
contributions to climate change all while addressing the domestic 
inequalities that have been overlooked for far too long.  In doing so, any 
federal response to climate change would not so quickly fall victim to 
criticism that it is not “recogniz[ing] the direct kinship between social 
 
115 Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for a 
Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169, 170 (2008). 
116 There is a supported view that legislators “crafting climate rules in Congress and 
beyond will have an unparalleled opportunity to implement policy that accounts for climate 
justice concerns,” but that window is closing rapidly. Id. at 171.  
117 Id. at 172. 
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inequality and environmental degradation.”
118
 
Ultimately, in order for there to be any sincere attention to the 
social destruction that climate change will inevitably bring, a moral shift 
must emerge amongst the leaders and policymakers of the world.  To 
date it appears as though both developing and industrial nations are 
suffering from a lack of moral conviction.
119
  It is a deficiency that has 
produced the shortsightedness of legislative and economic proposals.  
The focus of any plan must stem from the admission that to go forth 
with the same attitude that has produced such grave harm would be 
immoral.  This notion is ethically justifiable because as Donald Brown 
asserts: 
[D]istributive justice demands that the burdens of reducing a 
problem either be shared equally or based upon merit or 
deservedness, there is no conceivable equitably based formula that 
would allow the United States to continue to emit at existing levels 
once it is understood that steep reductions are called for.
120
 
The greatest disappointment of the Waxman-Markey bill is that it 
refuses to make the difficult political decision that just happens to be the 
easiest ethical one.  The bill both postpones the essential and ignores 
attempts to perfect its inherent inadequacies.  It does not recognize that 
time is running out and that emissions cuts delayed will not be able to 
account for the aggregate concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere. 
Many scientists and policy makers believe that a doubling of CO2 
from pre-industrial levels to 560 [parts per million] ppm may be 
unavoidable in the 21st century. This is so because the world’s 
political and economic system cannot respond rapidly enough to 
make faster changes in some major polluting sources such as 
gasoline-powered automobiles or coal-fired power plants. . . . Even if 
all nations could have stabilized emissions in the year 2002, the 
concentrations of GHGs would continue to rise and would approach 
500 ppm by the year 2100. After that, GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere would continue to rise for several hundred years before 
stabilization would be achieved. Even to stabilize CO2 at 1,000 ppm 
will require reductions of emissions below current levels.
121
 
The acknowledgement that climate change solutions require moral 
 
118 Id. at 193. 
119 Donald A. Brown, The U.S. Performance in Achieving Its 1992 Earth Summit 
Global Warming Commitments, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10741, 10762 (2002). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 10756. 
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commitments will yield unprecedented results.  CDMs, in particular, 
will be vital in harnessing such promises. They will be instrumental for 
“attracting an increased flow of investments to green EJ development 
zones and stimulating technology transfers to communities that might 
not otherwise benefit from these [innovations] in their early 
development and dissemination phases.”
122
  The CDM approach, 
however, is nowhere near perfect.  This approach still hinges on the 
social sensitivities of a market that has proven itself unforgiving.  
Nevertheless, environmental scholars contend that without a domestic 
CDM, a “cap-and-trade approach will very likely repeat many old and 
dangerous mistakes.”
123
  “Carbon-trading,” if not coupled with some 
assurance of climate justice, will inevitably aggravate the “negative 
effects of the co-pollutants that result from the same source.”
124
 
On the eve of the United Nations Climate Change Summit in 
Copenhagen, ethical considerations have become much more 
pronounced in the climate change debate in the United States Congress.  
As a result, a potential compromise has emerged between those who 
favor cap and trade and those who prefer a carbon tax.  On December 
11, 2009, Democratic Senator Maria Cantwell and her Republican co-
sponsor Senator Susan Collins introduced the Carbon Limits and 
Energy for America’s Renewal Act (“CLEAR”) which calls for the 
implementation of a cap and refund system.
125
  The CLEAR Act offers a 
potentially “attractive and effective climate policy alternative to 
traditional cap-and-trade or carbon tax policies.”
126
  The bill already 
surpasses Waxman-Markey and the Senate’s Kerry-Boxer bill in terms 
of “simplicity, transparency, and equity.”
127
 
The bill, which is thirty-nine pages in length, would establish an 
“upstream cap on fossil carbon,” a 100 percent auction open “only to 
energy producers and importers (and not Wall Street) with prices set by 
the market within a bounded price collar,” and an “equal monthly 
 
122 Burkett, supra note 95, at 222.  
123 Id. 
124 Examples of co-pollutants include “toxic and cancer-causing hydrocarbons, mercury, 
and particulate matter.” Id. at 234. 
125 Sen. Maria Cantwell, The CLEAR Act: A Cap & Refund Approach to Energy 
Independence and Climate Change Mitigation, U.S. SEN. MARIA CANTWELL, 1 (Dec. 10, 
2009), http://cantwell.senate.gov/issues/CLEAR%20Act%20Overview%20Memo.pdf. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
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distribution of auction revenues to every American.”
128
  The bill 
recognizes the need for climate change policy to reflect a degree of 
ethical responsiveness.  CLEAR streamlines funding for clean energy 
research and development, programs that mitigate non-CO2 greenhouse 
gas emissions, and “needs-based regionally-specific assistance for 
communities and workers transitioning to a clean energy economy.”
129
  
The bill also appears to signal a stronger commitment to emissions 
reduction by not allowing offsets and thus “remov[ing] some of the 
incentive for American companies [not] to make the transition to a low-
carbon [and GHG-free] way of doing business.”
130
 
The CLEAR Act’s focus on an “upstream point of regulation” 
(producer/importer level), recognizes that there are fewer entities to 
regulate at that level and, as a result, there will be “fewer opportunities 
to game the system if the cost of allowances is imposed before fossil 
fuels are distributed among the many different energy-intensive 
industries.”
131
  Furthermore, this bill, unlike Waxman-Markey and 
Kerry-Boxer, auctions the allowances from the outset.
132
  The auction 
process is also much more tightly regulated.  The allowances are 
“tradable only among [producers/importers] and only via a government-
hosted exchange with publicly listed prices.”
133
  The price of allowances 
at auction is another distinct feature between CLEAR and its 
congressional counterparts.  The bill limits the price of allowances by 
“both a floor and a ceiling (commonly known as price collar).”
134
  In the 
first years of the auction the prices would range between $7 and $21, 
but the bill provides for “an adjustment mechanism that would raise the 
band” to $16 to $40 by 2025, and to about $75 to $160 by 2050.
135
  
Additionally, the bill would require that “75 percent of auction revenue 
 
128 Id.  The CLEAR Act keeps the emissions reduction targets outlined in the Waxman-
Markey, bill but it does not rely on “free allowances to industry, unverifiable offsets, or 
other giveaways.” Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Craig Gannett & Lauren Giles Wishnie, Climate Change: Sen. Cantwell Introduces 
Alternatives to Gap and Trade, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Dec. 15, 2009), 
http://www.dwt.com/LearningCenter/Advisories?find=168218 (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
131 Id. 
132 Id.  
133 Id. 
134 Id.  
135 Id. Earlier supporters of the CLEAR Act observe that the pricing mechanism creates 
predictability, which will make it easer “for businesses to plan for and finance the necessary 
investments.” Id. 
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be returned to consumers” in the form of “nontaxable monthly cash 
dividend paid on an equal per-capita basis to all legal residents of the 
United States.”
136
 
The remaining twenty-five percent of auction revenue, although 
not returned to consumers, will be invested into a Clean Energy 
Reinvestment Trust Fund (CERT).
137
  The Fund is meant to help 
“accelerate the nation’s urgently needed transition to a cleaner twenty-
first century energy system and other climate-change-related priorities,” 
and as a result signals an unprecedented commitment to being ethically 
responsive in the implementation of climate change policies.
138
 CERT 
would use existing Congressional budget and appropriations processes 
“exclusively to finance a variety of critical climate mitigation and 
adaptation programs as well as programs designed or administered by 
the Clean Energy Deployment Administration” while assuring that the 
implementation of the CLEAR Act remains deficit-neutral.
139
  The 
anticipated use of the Fund would include: (1) providing “transition 
assistance to affected industries and workers experiencing economic 
dislocation due to climate change efforts”; (2) providing “mitigation and 
adaptation assistance to communities experiencing negative impacts 
from climate change”; (3) supporting “training programs to prepare 
workers for careers in energy efficiency, renewable energy and clean 
technology”; and (4) supporting “low-income energy efficiency loan 
programs.”
140
 
 
136 Gannett &  Giles Wishnie, supra note 130. 
137 See Cantwell, supra note 125, at 6. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 See Gannet & Giles Wishnie, supra note 130. The CERT Fund would also include 
investments for: “(A) targeted and region-specific compensation for early retirement of 
carbon-intensive facilities, machinery, or related assets in the United States that are stranded 
by new market dynamics; (B) mitigation of greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide 
from fossil carbon and non-greenhouse substances that exacerbate or accelerate climate 
change (such as black carbon); (C) cost-effective domestic and international projects that 
verifiably reduce, avoid, or sequester greenhouse gas emissions, such as agriculture, 
forestry, or other land use practices; (D) investments in low and no carbon energy and fuels 
research, development, and deployment activities; (E) projects or initiatives that verifiably 
increase energy efficiency or energy productivity; (F) projects or initiatives that support 
residential fuel switching, particularly home heating oil; (G) weatherization and energy 
efficiency improvements of low-income and public buildings; (H) funding for climate 
change mitigation and adaptation projects, activities and research to increase the resilience 
of human populations and communities, fish and wildlife, and managed and unmanaged 
terrestrial, aquatic and marine ecosystems; (I) cost-effective projects that provide adaptation 
services in areas and countries in which climate change or ocean acidification impacts are 
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The ethical complications that emerge from the use of a cap and 
trade system are directly associated with this approach’s exclusive focus 
on overall reduction instead of equitable concerns related to the systems 
“distributional effects.”
141
  Without directly addressing the disparate 
impacts of GHG emissions, any political decision on climate change 
policy will condemn future generations with a burden that should 
belong to the present generation.
142
  Ultimately, cap and trade fails to 
meet the ethical duty to respond to climate change because it stands for 
the proposition that such a duty can only be fostered with a profit 
making incentive.
143
 The CLEAR Act in its initial form appears to 
salvage the ethical integrity of a domestic climate change policy.  The 
bill recognizes the urgency of the moment and establishes an ethical 
framework for altering the societal behaviors that have led to climate 
change. 
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: CAP AND TRADE AND ITS 
ETHICAL IMPASSIVENESS 
Fixing rights and duties theory to emissions trading reveals that 
because “the right to a clean environment exists as a statement of 
positive law; a corresponding duty exists among others not to pollute.”
144
  
In fact, international and domestic laws demonstrate that the right to 
live in a clean environment is legally cognizable, while no such right is 
 
likely to be most severe;  and (J) programs that protect or advocate for energy consumers 
relating to changes in rates and services as a result of the CLEAR Act.” See Cantwell, supra 
note 125, at 7. 
141 Gannet & Giles Wishnie, supra note 130. 
142 “If we wait forty or fifty years before taking serious action, the die will have been 
cast and a thousand generations of our descendants will have to live with the consequences 
of the climate we bequeathed them.” R.T. Pierrehumbert, Climate Change: A Catastrophe in 
Slow Motion, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 573, 580 (2006). 
143 Consider that fact that giving allowances to polluters will create windfall profits for 
those firms. These high-scale profits would result because cap and trade programs, as a 
Congressional Budget Office report reveals, “still result in higher prices for consumers and 
households but would not impose additional cost on [emitting] firms. Even if the companies 
received allowances for free, they would raise prices to their customers because the cost of 
using an emission allowance for production—rather than selling it to another firm—would 
be embodied in the prices that they would charge for their goods and services.” Peter R. 
Orszag, Testimony: Approaches to Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions, CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET OFFICE (Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ 
ftpdocs/87xx/doc8769/11-01-co2emissions.pdf. 
144 Kirk W. Junker, Ethical Emissions Trading and the Law, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 
149, 170 (2006). 
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recognized for polluting.
145
  Nevertheless, proposals to establish a 
system of accountability fail to recognize this assertion.  The Waxman-
Markey bill claims that the cap and trade system will help reconfigure 
the way Americans use and make energy through the half-century mark.  
Unfortunately, Waxman-Markey will accomplish no such thing.  It is 
even unlikely that it will achieve its primary goal of substantially 
cutting GHG emissions and turning around the trend of climate 
change.
146
 
Michael Hoexter describes cap and trade programs as “ethical 
trap[s],” for they reassert the view that markets are better than 
government.
147
  The notion appears ever more ironic in light of the 
financial debacle that world has borne witness to in the last year.  The 
people of the world have been able to tap into the market’s ability to 
generate wealth at an imaginable rate but they too have seen that if not 
regulated, a market will act on its fundamental impulse to use 
“resources profligately and without regard for its impacts in search of 
short-term favorable return on investments.”
148
  The only thing 
Waxman-Markey succeeds in doing is avoiding what direct government 
regulation can do, stamp a vote of no-confidence on business-as usual 
attitudes. 
If Waxman-Markey, or some form of it, becomes the law of the 
land, then Congressman Kucinich’s fear will become reality.
149
  Cap and 
trade signals reluctance on the part of government to “take direct 
responsibility for carbon mitigation.”
150
  In this system, the 
government’s accountability will be limited to setting the cap, and from 
that point forward, the carbon market takes the reins by determining 
 
145 A vast number of laws and constitutions around the world “recognize the right of a 
legal person to enjoy a healthy or clean environment,” but “nowhere will one find the act of 
polluting the natural environment explicitly established as a right for any legal person . . . in 
any international or municipal source of law.” Id. at 161-63. 
146  John Entine, The Last Word: U.S. Climate Bill-Cap-and-Trade Catastrophe, 
ETHICAL CORPORATION, (Sep. 15, 2009), http://www.jonentine.com/ 
ethical_corporation/2009_09_US_Climate_Bill_Cap-and-trade.htm 
147 Michael Hoexter, Cap and Trade Derails Climate Ethics the Motive Force of 
Carbon Mitigation—Part 2, FUTURELAB (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.futurelab.net/blogs 
/marketing-strategy-innovation/2010/03/cap_and_trade_derails_climate_.html_0. 
148 Id. (arguing that cap and trade is an “effort to clothe the administrative and ethical 
role of government in the supposed ethics and/or efficiency of markets, in this case, the 
carbon permit market.”). 
149 Rep. Kucinich observed that “passing a weak bill today gives us a weak 
environmental policy tomorrow.” See Soft & Kirshner, supra note 93. 
150 See Hoexter, supra note 147.  
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carbon prices. 
In the end, cap and trade makes it very difficult to discern who is 
responsible for climate protection, as the government will always be 
able to place fault in the market that it initially entrusted.  Hoexter 
suggests that many may view the system’s ability to “[insulate] climate 
policy from the vicissitudes of politics” as positive, but in reality all that 
this insulation does is make a nation’s climate policy “ineffectual, non-
transparent, and corruptible by system stakeholders who are interested 
in maintaining a fossil fueled status quo.”
151
  The process by which low 
GHG and GHG-free technologies are put in place to aid the cut of 
emissions will be directly controlled by market forces. 
Cap and trade, as designed under Waxman-Markey and Kerry-
Boxer, will never succeed in achieving an equitable reduction of GHGs.  
It will not foster the ingenuity and innovation that is necessary when it 
is needed the most.  Weak caps and the over-allocation of allowances 
will never create profound commitments to cut emissions.  The system 
institutes no incentive for firms to cut their pollution levels beyond what 
the cap already requires them to do.  In essence, cap and trade lacks the 
impetus necessary for a moral and ethical response to climate change to 
take hold.
152
 
The Waxman-Markey bill would allow start-up firms to acquire up 
to two billion offset credits every year.
153
  The two billion tons of carbon 
dioxide that these offsets represent account for a greater percentage than 
the reduction that the bill would require each year through 2026.
154
 
“[U]sing this quantity of offsets would allow capped emitters as a whole 
to increase their emissions by [thirty eight percent] by 2012.”
155
  Even 
more preposterous is the fact that firms would not have to reduce their 
 
151 Id. After the cap is set, Waxman-Markey, along with all the other carbon cap and 
trade system proposals, dares to suggest that the “supposedly impersonal forces of the 
market will determine the outcome; within the policy’s design by intention no agent is 
simultaneously directing the investments process and responsive to the calls for climate 
action.” Id. 
152 Cap and trade systems merely establish a floor. That is to say, once a firm’s 
emissions are below the cap they have “no incentive to do better.” See Why Hansen is Right: 
Cap-and-Trade will Make the Climate Problem Worse, Not Better, 
http://dl.getdropbox.com/u/390139/ifr/cap%20and%20trade.doc (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).  
153 Bill Barclay & Patrick McCully, Initial Analysis of Offsets Provisions in the Draft of 
the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, INTERNATIONAL RIVERS (Apr. 15, 
2009), http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/WaxmanIRRAN.pdf. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
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emissions back to 2005 levels for nearly two decades. Furthermore, “if 
all eligible offsets were used, the [twenty percent] reduction supposed to 
happen by 2020 would not actually be reached until 2036, [and] the 
reduction in 2050 would be only [fifty percent] rather than the stated 
[eighty-three percent].”
156
 
The shortcomings of a traditional cap and trade approach are not 
based on speculation. This market solution’s inability to address climate 
change is clear to anyone who reviews how the system is meant to 
function.  Even cap and trade’s creator, Dr. Thomas Crocker, has stated 
that he is “skeptical that cap-and-trade is the most effective way to go 
about regulating carbon.”
157
  Crocker’s doubt is based on the position 
that cap and trade is “better suited for discrete, local pollution 
problems.”
158
  Cap and trade is also ineffective in combating climate 
change because economists have been unable to quantify the economic 
damage of climate change.  Therefore, “without knowing how costly 
climate change is,” the market would be unable to correctly determine 
“how tight a grip to put on emissions.”
159
 
The founder of cap and trade has recognized the system as 
ineffective in taking on the challenge of curbing climate change.  What 
is needed is direct government regulation that establishes a moral duty 
not to emit harmful pollutants that risk placing our planet in peril 
coupled with a tax aimed at punishing those who breach that duty.  
Crocker has suggested than an “outright tax on emissions” is much 
more desirable because it would be “easier to enforce and [would 
provide the] need[ed] flexibility to deal with the problem” of climate 
change.
160
  A carbon tax/emissions penalty would impose a duty on 
emitters, and would channel an ethical perspective that suggests that 
 
156 Id. at 4. 
157 Jon Hilsenrath, Cap-and-Trade’s Unlikely Critics: Its Creators, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
13, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125011380094927137.html. 
158 Id. 
159 See Hoexter, supra note 147. 
160 Id. “Within the relatively efficient category of approaches that rely on the power of 
markets, a tax on emissions is generally more efficient than a cap-and-trade system. The 
reason is that although both a tax and a cap-and-trade system encourage firms to find the 
lowest-cost reductions at a particular point in time, a tax provides greater flexibility over 
time, allowing firms to achieve reductions when they are least expensive. In particular, a tax 
encourages firms to make greater reductions in emissions at times when the cost of doing so 
is low and allows them leeway to lessen their efforts when the cost is high.” See Peter R. 
Orzag, Implications of a Cap-and-Trade Program for Carbon Dioxide Emissions, CONG. 
BUDGET OFF. (Apr. 24, 2008), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/91xx/doc9134/04-24-
Cap_Trade_Testimony.pdf. 
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individuals are willing to penalize human behavior that puts all life at 
harm.
161
 
While the United Nations Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen 
failed to produce a legally binding commitment to reduce GHG 
emissions, it has reframed the debate as an ethical issue.  The ethics of 
climate change were inserted into the fold before the negotiations even 
began. To improve the likelihood that a global climate agreement could 
be reached at the Copenhagen conference, European Union leaders 
agreed to pay $10.5 billion over three years to help developing countries 
in the battle against global warming.
162
  The developing world is seeking 
a long-term financing pledge for more than $100 billion each year from 
the industrial powers who have not yet answered how much they would 
offer in the long term.
163
  In the days leading to the Copenhagen Summit, 
the United Nations confirmed that the European Union’s pledge to 
support a global climate fund is up to $30 billion, the largest investment 
commitment to date.
164
 
Copenhagen’s inability to produce a binding agreement does not 
make it a failure.  The United States, after years of standing 
indifferently against concerns of worsening climate change, helped form 
a consensus at the eleventh hour of the two-week negotiation.  The 
agreement that was presented to the conference, facilitated by President 
Obama and the heads of state from China, India, Brazil, and South 
Africa, did not meet the goal of constructing a binding international 
treaty for 2010, provoking the most influential nations to acknowledge 
that there is a crisis and to began implementing domestic responses.
165
 
The accord provides a system for monitoring and reporting 
progress toward those national pollution-reduction goals, a compromise 
on an issue over which China bargained hard. It calls for hundreds of 
billions of dollars to flow from wealthy nations to those countries most 
vulnerable to a changing climate. And it sets a goal of limiting the 
global temperature rise to two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels 
 
161 See Hoexter, supra note 147. 
162 James Kanter & Andrew C. Revin, Europe Pledges Billions in Climate Funding, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/12/ 
science/earth/12climate.html?scp=17&sq=climate% 20change&st=cse. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 John M. Broder, Many Goals Remain Unmet in 5 Nations’ Climate Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/ science/earth/19climate.html? 
scp=3&sq=climate%0change&st=cse. 
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by 2050, implying deep cuts in climate-altering emissions over the next 
four decades.
166
 
While it is true that the plan does not commit industrialized or 
developing nations to specific goals for midterm and long-term 
emissions cutbacks, the measure is significant.  It legitimizes the pledge 
of nations to work to control the progression of global warming, as it 
concedes that economic self-interest must no longer stall discussions on 
mitigating the harms of climate change.
167
 
Not everyone is as optimistic about the symbolism of the 
Copenhagen meetings and, to a certain degree, with proper reason.  
Andreas Carlgren, the environment minister of Sweden, said that the 
“summit meeting had been a ‘great failure’ partly because other nations 
had rejected targets and a timetable for the rest of the world to sign on 
to binding emissions reductions.”
168
 The European Union went into the 
conference hoping to lead by example on emission cuts, but it has been 
greatly criticized by environmental and industrial groups for not 
directing other nations to follow suit.
169
  The shortcomings of the 
Summit, however, should not eclipse the reality that climate change 
discussions are progressing.  The discussion leading to Copenhagen, 
and following it, has forced climate change to be framed as a global 
ethical issue.
170
  Developed nations, like the United States, can no longer 
excuse their positions on climate change on account of “national 
interest.”
171
  These nations will have to conform their national policies to 
what ethics, justice, and human rights demand of them.  For example, 
each nation would be required to make an individual climate change 
policy that is equal to its fair share of emissions.  Although there may be 
some disagreements as to what is fair, an ethical view would eliminate 
excuses that climate change policies may impose new costs or put 
certain industries at risk financially.
172
 
 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 James Kanter, E.U. Blames Others for ‘Great Failure’ on Climate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
22, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/23/world/europe/23ihtclimate.html? 
scp=25&sq=climate%20change&st=cese. 
169 Id. 
170 Donald A. Brown, Two Climate Change Matters Move to Center Stage in 
Copenhagen with Profound Implications for Developed Nations: Ethics and Adaptation, 
ROCK ETHICS INST., http://climateethics.org/?p=331 (last visited Dec. 17, 2009).  
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
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In the United States, for instance, opposition to climate change 
legislation asserts that a “proposed bill [would] hurt the coal industry in 
a coal state, a position that seems to ignore the responsibility of people 
in coal states to protect poor people in Africa from climate change.”
173
 
However, a glimmer of hope has emerged in the United States Senate.  
The Cantwell-Collins measure addresses the deep-seated ethical 
complications of past climate change policy proposals by implementing 
an ethical conscience cap and refund system.
174
  The bill would return 
the majority of the revenue collected from setting a price on carbon 
emissions to consumers who will be paying higher costs for energy.
175
  
The average household is expected to receive an annual tax-free refund 
of about $1,100.
176
  One quarter of the revenue collected will “be used 
for clean energy research, assistance to hard-hit communities, energy 
efficiency programs and reductions in greenhouse gases other than 
carbon dioxide.”
177
  Cantwell-Collins recognizes what Waxman-Markey 
and Kerry-Boxer have ignored.  That is, if the issue is an ethical one, no 
nation can ignore its obligation to others around the world or its own 
most at risk regions in developing polices for climate change.
178
 
Without implementing a measure that creates an ethical duty, no 
substantial shifts in human activity will emerge.  This duty is essential if 
any of the world’s governments are truly serious about addressing 
climate change.  This duty is necessary because it asserts what basic 
contract law declares, that “‘where a party does or promises to do what 
he is already legally obligated to do or promises to refrain from doing or 
refrains from doing what he is not legally privileged to do he has not 
incurred detriment’” because his activity is founded on a pre-existing 
duty.
179
 Without establishing a duty “upon which the parties agree, there 
is a failure of consideration and thus a failure of contract.”
180
  The 
contract would create a duty between humans to safeguard their planet, 
and ultimately their home.  This duty, which would never emerge under 
 
173 Id. 
174 John M. Broder, Senators Offer New Climate Proposals, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 
2009), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/senators-offer-new-climate-proposals/. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id.. 
179 See Junker, supra note 144 at 169 (quoting Joseph D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, 
The Law of Contracts, § 4.9 (West, 4th ed. 1998)). 
180 Id. 
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a cap and trade system, recognizes the human right to a clean and 
protected environment.  What emerges then is an ethical commitment to 
preserve the planet that welcomed life and not defer that responsibility 
to future world. Copenhagen’s inability to conclude with a binding 
treaty should not overshadow the recent domestic developments that 
have taken a much more transparent and meaningful climate change 
policy.  The Senate Cantwell-Collins CLEAR Act, a refreshing 
alternative to Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer, imposes immediate 
obligations, placing the protection of our planet “in the public trust[, 
which] cannot be sold by the government nor licensed for sale by the 
government.”
181
 
 
 
181 Id. at 166. 
